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Introduction 
Fishery rent is defined as the difference between the landed value of 
fish and the full economic costs of bringing a catch to port, net of any 
other types of rent which may be eamed. However, at any one time 
not al1 of this surplus is necessarily the rent that is attributable to the 
scarcity of the fish resource. Some of the surplus may reflect short 
term supply and demand imbalances, with "above normal" profits 
being the market signal required to induce greater investment in the 
fishery. 
In a competitive market, free entry and exit of economic agents will 
ensure the absence of economic rent. In an open access fishery, fishing 
effort will be at a level which ensures the same result. However, this 
' The author would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
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level will be reached in the absence of any sustainability constraints, 
and there would be a natural tendency for the fishery stock to be over 
exploited. In the absence of discrete and enforceable property rights 
over the resource, individual fishermen would have little incentive to 
conserve the fish stock or to harvest the fish efficiently because the 
benefits of doing so may be appropriated by other fishermen. Some 
form of government intervention is generally required therefore 
to conserve the resource and to promote a more efficient level of 
harvesting. 
This paper addresses the question of the optimal determination of 
license or access fees by island nation States whose exclusive econornic 
zones (EEZS) contain highly productive fishing grounds. These nations 
own the resource, but frequently permit its extraction by vessels from 
distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in retum for license or access 
fees generally based on the reported catch. The important question 
of compliance by DWFNs with their obligations to report catches in 
the EEZs will not be considered here, except to state that the advent 
of obligatory in-port transhipment in countries belonging to the Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) appears to have produced a significant 
improvement in compliance procedures. 
Economic Rent and the Value of 
Access in a Managed Tuna Fishery 
An open-access or unmanaged fishery does not generate resource (or 
fishery) rent, although some of its participants may earn other kinds 
of rents. This is because the advantages of the fishery in terms of its 
natural productivity are offset by competitive forces resulting in over- 
exploitation, which in tum lowers the return to fishing effort. This is 
illustrated in Figure 1 which shows the average and marginal retum 
to fishing effort in a single species, single location fishery. The average 
return to effort is the average catch per unit effort for the fleet 
multiplied by the extra harvest which would result from an extra unit 
of fishing effort. The unit cost of effort is its opportunity cost, defined 
as the value of output which the factors of production involved in 
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producing fishing effort could produce if they were employed in 
another industry. Opportunity cost is measured in a conventional way 
using market prices of inputs such as labour, capital, and fuel. The 
open-access equilibrium is at EO where the average return to effort 
equals its unit cost. At effort levels below EO the average retum to 
effort is higher than its opportunity cost, indicating that additional 
entrants to the fishery could eam economic profits, i.e. profits in excess 
of the level required to generate a market rate of return on capital. At 
effort levels higher than EO the vessels in the fishery are making an 
economic loss, i.e. they are eaming a lower rate of retum than the 
market rate or, equivalently, they are not covenng the cost of the effort 
they employ. Therefore, effort level EO is the long run open-access 
equilibrium level at which there is neither the incentive to enter nor 
exit the fishery. At this level of effort the fishery rent is zero as total 
revenues for the fleet are just equal to the total costs of generating 
those revenues. 
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One objective of fishery management is to maximise the amount of 
rent which could be generated. This could be achieved by restricting 
fishing effort to the level E*. At that level the marginal retum to effort 
is equal to the unit opportunity cost of effort. The total economic 
profit, or rent, eamed by the fishery is given by the area C*BDC which 
represents the economic profit per unit of effort, BD, multiplied by 
the amount of effort, E*. This rent is the resource rent. It represents 
the retum which the owner of the fish stock would receive in a perfectly 
competitive economy with a complete set of enforceable property 
rights over the resource. It is sometimes termed "management rent" 
in recognition of the fact that, given that an unmanaged fishery yields 
no economic rent in a purely competitive environment, with no 
property rights to the fish stock, a regulatory framework is required 
for rents to be realised. 
Fishing effort can be restricted to E* in two ways, both of which 
involve the collection of economic rent by the managers of the fishery. 
One way is to charge a royalty on the catch, reducing the average 
retum per unit of effort until it equals unit cost at effort level E*. The 
alternative is to impose a charge per unit of effort to raise the 
opportunity cost of effort until it equals the average return at E*. These 
two methods are illustrated by the curves C*AR* and C*C*, which 
show the net of royalty return and the gross of access charge cost 
respectively. Most access fee agreements currently involve the 
imposition of an additional cost per unit of effort, the level of which 
is intended to be equivalent to a particular level of ad valorem royalty 
on the harvest. 
Even if fishing within an EEZ can be treated as a single species, single 
area fishery, DWFNs have the choice of fishing in one of a number of 
EEZs, or on the high seas. At any point in time, the productivity of 
fishing grounds, as measured by the average and marginal returns to 
effort, will Vary from one EEZ to another. There are two models of 
how fleets will be allocated among EEZs : one approach, based on the 
concept of open-access equilibrium argues that average returns to 
effort, net of access fees and transport costs, will be equalised across 
zones ; the other approach, based on the optimal allocation of fishing 
effort, argues that the fleets will allocate effort to the EEZs so as to 
equalise the net marginal retum to effort. Assuming that the high seas 
pockets can be neglected, these two approaches will coincide when 
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the managers of the EEZs are charging the access fee C*C and effort 
in each zone is at E*. 
Exclusive economic zones of island countries have the potential to 
yield 'rent' because of the natural productivity of their fishing grounds 
relative to others. The "value of access" can be regarded as an 
augmented rent that arises because a certain fishing zone, over which 
a third party has exclusive control of fishing rights, produces a higher 
rent than another zone. Under conditions of perfect competition and 
open access, the value of access would equal economic rent since the 
alternative fishing zone would retum zero rent. 
The value of access therefore is the value of a particular fishing zone 
which, if levied as a tax, would make a fishing Company indifferent 
between fishing in that particular zone or in the next most productive 
zone. 
For island countries, the value of access is generally regarded as the 
value of fishing in their EEZs as compared with the alternative of the 
neighbouring high seas. Ideally this "value" should determine the 
fees paid by DWFNs, since ownership of the resource resides with the 
island countries. Appropriation of this augmented rent would also 
assist in preventing overfishing. However, because of the migratory 
nature of tuna, the value of the annual catch of tuna in the EEZ of any 
one country will differ from year to year. It will also Vary according 
to both environmental and market conditions. Thus the value of access 
will differ through both time and geographical space. 
Measuring Fishery Rent 
and -the Value of Access 
Whilst fishery rent and value of access are simple terms to define, 
attributing an approximate numerical value to them would involve 
collection and evaluation of vast amounts of data. The size of any 
potential resource rent will depend on market prices, the technology 
available to capture and deliver the fish to market, the quality of the 
fishing ground, the quantity of fish available, and the location of the 
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fishery. However, not only will the magnitude of resource rent Vary 
substantially from fishery to fishery at any one time, but within a 
fishery the same factors will cause the level of rent to Vary in any one 
period. In addition, over time there will be changes in fisheries 
management, fishing technology, the cost of fishing inputs, the size 
of the fish stock, and other supply-side factors which can affect the 
operational and economic environment of fisheries. On the demand 
side, characteristics of the fishery may be altered by changes in 
consumer real income, changes in tastes, and various tariffs and taxes. 
The extent of such changes in supply and demand on the amount of 
rent will depend on the size of the changes and the extent to which 
the pnce elasticities of demand and supply are altered. 
At least in theory, a resource rent tax or some form of auctioning of 
fishing nghts would, under ideal market conditions, provide an ideal 
method for collecting licence fees based on the true value of access. 
Both approaches involve minimum distortion in the market, whilst 
also being very flexible with regard to changes in biological and 
economic conditions. In practice, however, these two alternatives 
suffer from a number of drawbacks that render them unattractive to 
many island countries. The inability of such countries to check the 
veracity of reported catches and cost levels of DWFNs would make a 
resource rent tax difficult to calculate and monitor, while the auction 
of fishing nghts requires a reasonably competitive market to work at 
all. The latter condition does not appear to exist in tuna fisheries 
worldwide. 
f i e  current practice in the South Pacific of calculating access fees as 
a percentage of expected revenue or, as is the case with the United 
States Treaty, a flat fee, has only a fairly tenuous link with the "value 
of access". This preoccupation with a specific percentage for the 
access fee rate is, superficially, an attractive concept because of its 
simplicity. However, it ignores the reality of the distinction between 
an access fee based on total revenue compared to one based on the 
value of access. Effectively, the "percentage" method for calculating 
the access fee has more in common with an income tax than a resource 
rent tax. 
For the South Pacific a number of studies have been undertaken to 
assess the value of access to the region's EEZs (reported in Maxwell 
and Owen, 1995), and the uncertainties and complexities inherent in 
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such work suggest that the figures be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless, it does appear that current fee rates may be lower 
(perhaps considerably lower) than could reasonably be charged on 
the basis of the value of access. This is an area where research funding 
is very necessary to clarify an extremely controversial issue. 
Collection of Fishery Rent 
There is a strong case for not attempting to appropriate the entire rent 
that a fishery may generate. Since the precise level of resource rent 
is difficult to quantify, over-estimating the rent would result in penal 
taxation and associated efficiency losses. Under-estimating the rent, 
however, has no efficiency implications. In fact, appropriating less 
than the full rent will give an incentive for innovative behaviour by 
fishermen. Allocating private property rights and deciding not to take 
the entire rent involves a one off transfer to the current generation of 
fishermen. The value of the rent foregone will become capitalised 
into the quota or license values which new entrants to the industry 
will have to purchase. 
Alternative methods of rent collection will affect fisherman in different 
ways because of different technological and cost stmctures and varying 
levels of expertise. Essentially, rent collection can be achieved through 
a charge on output, on inputs, on accounting profit, or on net cash 
flow. For island countries dealing with DWFNs, input or output charges 
are invanably considered to be the appropriate method for capturing 
part of the rent, as the other schemes rely on accounting procedures 
and overseas taxation schemes which are generally inappropriate tools 
for assessing fee structures for non-residents. 
Charges on the quantity or value of fish caught, or on the inputs used, 
have the virtue of being administratively simple compared with the 
alternative profits based charges. Although input or output charges 
can be used as the principal managenient measure to control effort 
in a fishery, any difference between the charge and the actual rent 
will be reflected in a departure from the optimum level of fishing 
effort. 
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A problem is that neither the value of output nor the value of inputs 
is necessarily related to profitability : it is profitability which should 
indicate the amount of rent in the fishery. The price of fish could fa11 
so that no rent existed, but an output charge would still need to be 
paid. If output or input charges were to reflect profitability, then the 
amounts (percentage or fixed fee) would need to be renegotiated at 
frequent intervals. This process would be time consuming and costly 
for al1 parties. 
A charge based directly on profitability would be less distorting than 
input or output charges, because it should represent a more accurate 
reflection of the level of rent. Profitability can be measured through 
accounts submitted for tax purposes and the charge for access to the 
fishery levied at the same time as individual or Company tax, as a 
percentage of profits. However, profit measured for tax purposes 
generally differs significantly from economic profit, particularly in 
terms of depreciation allowances and the concept of the opportunity 
cost of capital. For this reason a charge based upon net cash flow may 
be more appropriate. This itself has a major drawback in terms of 
volatility, with cash flow being negative in years of major capital 
purchases and positive when such purchases are absent. The property 
of neutrality (and therefore of no economic loss of efficiency) can 
only be preserved if the negative cash flows are used to offset positive 
cash flows (appropriately discounted) in other years. 
In underdeveloped fisheries the market can be used, through 
competitive bidding, to determine the level of the rent charge and 
who can participate in the fishery. Auctioning access rights has the 
advantage that administrative costs are often low relative to the value 
of the right k i n g  sold, and the rights are sold in a non-discriminatory 
manner to those best able to exploit the resource. However, if little 
is known about the potential yields from a developing fishery, bidders 
are likely to be cautious, and small operators who are unable to meet 
the cost of research into the economic viability of the fishery may be 
excluded. 
Dissatisfaction with the level of access fees, and the widespread 
perception that DWFNs have, in the past, gone to great effort to under- 
record or under-report catches on which the fees are based, has 
encouraged many Pacific Island nations to consider the financial 
viability of establishing a domestic tuna fishing andlor processing 
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industry. The risks inherent in such ventures are clearly far greater 
than those associated with receiving access fees from DWFNs, but the 
perceived benefits are also significantly higher. The next section 
outlines the many considerations that must be addressed by Pacific 
Island nations considering this option (1). 
Domestic Participation in a Tuna 
Fishery with Particular Reference 
to the South Pacific 
Given the general scarcity of marketable natural resources in many 
island countries and the potential value of the tuna industry, optimal 
utilisation of the tuna resource to obtain maximum domestic benefit 
is important to  island governments. In promoting domestic 
participation in tuna industries, govemments are attempting to reap 
more benefits from the exploitation of their tuna stocks than if they 
had permitted stocks to be harvested only by the DWFN fleets in retum 
for access fee payments. 
The principle reasons for promoting domestic participation are: 
- to broaden the economic base of island countries; 
- to generate employment opportunities, foreign exchange, and 
govemment revenue; and 
- to facilitate the transfer of fishing and related technology to the 
islanders. 
Essentially there are three methods by which island countries can 
promote domestic participation in the tuna fisheries: by establishing 
a "domestic" fleet (either independently or as a joint venture with 
other nations), by establishing transhipment facilities, and by investing 
in the processing sector. 
1. A comprehensive bio-economic analysis of the many issues relating to 
tuna fishing and processing from the perspective of an island state is given 
in Campbell and Owen, 1994. 
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In the South Pacific, there has been an increase in joint ventures over 
recent years, although experience to date has been disappointing with 
few having met the expectations of their Pacific Island partners in 
terms of generating profits and employment, or providing the level 
of training required for countries to allow them to play a larger role 
in the fishing operations or the management of the Company. 
Investment in a domestic fleet has been an option taken up, at one 
time or another, by most Pacific Island countnes, with pole-and-line 
vessels being the usual form of participation. Over recent years they 
have accounted for around one-third of the total catch by such vessels. 
Although their importance in the longline and purse seine fisheries 
is increasing, Pacific Island country-flagged vessels only account for 
a very small percentage of the total catch. While the vast majority of 
longline vessels are foreign owned, there has been strong growth in 
the locally based longline fleet. The fact that they are locally based 
generates substantial economic benefits for the local economies 
through the employment of onshore staff, payment of government 
taxes and charges, and through the purchase of inputs for their fishing 
operations. 
On June 15, 1993, FFA member countries introduced a ban on 
transhipment at sea. In the years prior to the ban, the Taiwanese and 
Korean fleets had routinely transhipped their catches at sea, creating 
favourable conditions for under-reporting, and minimising any shore- 
based fisheries service industry benefits that might have accrued to 
the Pacific Island countries. The intent of the ban was to improve 
monitoring and surveillance of the foreign purse seine fleet and to 
generate additional benefits to local economies, whilst at the same 
time reducing fishing pressure on the resource. 
Countries involved in supplying transhipment facilities stand to gain 
financially from the registration, port and transhipment fees levied 
on the purse seiners and carrier vessels, as well as from expenditures 
made by the vesse1 operators and crews on provisions, fuel, agency 
services, entertainment, etc. However, potential benefits should be 
viewed with caution. Much of the anticipated local expenditure will 
be on goods that have to be imported (for example fuel and spares) 
and the net gain to the economy will be correspondingly lower. 
There is considerable potential for revenue from this source to increase, 
particularly if an expanded range of services is offered. However, 
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there are also potential social and environmental costs associated with 
the anival in ports of large numbers of purse seiners and canier vessels. 
For example, Kosrae had to be closed to transhipments in late 1993 
following the grounding of two Korean vessels on a reef near Okat 
harbour. Other real and potential problems include excessively high 
port charges, lack of local stevedoring services, social problems 
through foreign crews not observing local customs, and harbour 
pollution through rubbish dumping and emptying of bilges whilst in 
port. 
Domestic processing of tuna is generally considered to take two 
possible forms : loining or canning (or a combination of both). The 
former requires considerably less capital expenditure than canning, 
and lower worker skills. However, correspondingly, the value added 
is very much lower and loining is currently viewed as being an 
investment of limited value by Pacific Island couniries. 
The major perceived constraints on island countries regarding 
establishment of processing facilities are lack of industry expertise 
and lack of funds for the initial capital investment. One way of 
overcoming this problem would be a joint venture with major fishing 
and processing companies, but experience in Fiji and the Solomon 
Islands suggests that transfer pricing concems would be a major 
problem. 
However, cannenes have great appeal for island countnes suffenng 
from high levels of unemployment, since the work is very labour 
intensive. A cannery capable of processing around 30,000 tonnes a 
year would cost around US$ 40 million and would employ about 
1000 workers directly and about 700 indirectly. The same amount 
would purchase four super seiners but would only provide direct 
employment for around 40 islanders. 
A potential benefit of establishing canneries close to the fishing 
grounds is the time saving involved by unloading locally rather than 
delivenng to cannenes located closer to the major consuming nations. 
This not only saves on fuel, but may also permit additional fishing 
trips ansing from the time saving. 
There are, however, a number of factors that present potential barriers 
to undertaking a cannery venture. Access to a considerable, reliable, 
fresh water supply (amounting to around 1.3 million litres a day for 
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a 30,000 tonnes-a-year cannery, about 30 % less if sea water is used 
to thaw the tuna) is essential. This would immediately disqualify 
many island countnes unless investment in water desalinisation plants 
is to be part of the cannery investment. In addition, a reliable and 
relatively cheap source of electric power is required, amounting to 
around 3,500 kilowatts on a sustained basis. There is also the major 
operation of waste disposal, particularly waste-water, since this canies 
a potential threat to tounsm if not handled properly. Finally, acquisition 
of cans and lids could prove a major concern if they were not 
manufactured domestically. 
A financially successful cannery would provide major direct and 
indirect employment benefits for an island country. The local economy 
would be expanded through the increase in local spending power by 
the cannery workers and the revenue associated with servicing and 
provisioning the fishing vessels. However, these "multiplier" effects 
should not be exaggerated. In most (if not all) island count.nes the 
majority of consumer goods are imported and thus "leakage" of 
spending power out of the domestic economy is likely to be fairly 
rapid. 
Other economic benefits which could arise include improved levels 
of infrastructure and services, and training and employment 
opportunities. Apart from direct employment in the cannery itself, 
there would be an increased demand for labour to fil1 the requirement 
of tuna support operations, for example stevedoring, net repair, 
provisioning, transport, chandlery, hospitality, engineering, and 
electronics. In turn, there would be an increased demand for banking, 
legal, customs, and travel industry services. 
Government revenue should be enhanced in three respects: 
- income and sales taxes paid by employees of the cannery; 
- revenue taxes paid by the canning Company (following any tax 
holiday); and 
- taxes and duties paid both directly and indirectly by vesse1 owners 
and crews. 
To the extent that any reduction in access fees were offered to vessels 
landing their catch at the proposed facility, there would be a 
corresponding reduction in government revenue from this source. 
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Economic costs would be the deleterious effects of the investment. 
These will largely be environmental : noise and odour from the plant; 
increased traffic activity (and perhaps accidents) on local roads; and 
any adverse effects on altemative revenue-generating activities (for 
example tourism). 
A factor which appears, in the past, to have played a significant role 
in determining the profitability of canned tuna exports has been the 
underlying trend in real exchange rates. Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand have al1 benefited from favourable movements in their 
competitive positions because of declining real exchange rates, 
whereas those of South Pacific nations have remained relatively 
static (2). 
A major constraint to development of domestic-based tuna industries 
in island countries with relatively small economies is that the size of 
the investment could well exhaust the planning, management, and 
govemment advisory capacity of the country. For example, the GDP 
of Kiribati is currently about US$50 million in 1993. Thus investment 
in a cannery of the size outlined above would involve an investment 
amounting to 80% of GDP. Even one super seiner would involve 
expenditure amounting to around 20 % of GDP. There is also a high 
risk associated with such investments relative to the comparatively 
low cost investment in fishing support facilities. This is because the 
services sector is less affected by short-term fluctuations in catches 
or prices than are canning or fishing operations. To a large extent, 
many vessel and cannery inputs are required irrespective of the level 
of profit and, provided the vessel is covering its running costs, it is 
rational to continue fishing and canning at a loss in the short term. 
2. See Chapter 17 of Campbell and Owen, 1994, for an analysis of 
exchange rate fluctuations and comparative competitive advantage in 
canned tuna exporting nations. 
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Conclusion 
This paper has discussed the measurement and collection of economic 
rent in a managed tuna fishery with particular reference to Pacific 
Island nations. In general, these nations do not participate extensively 
in the harvesting of the tuna resources from their waters. To achieve 
any benefit from their renewable resources within their EEZs, they 
are therefore dependent on revenue raised from the access fees that 
can be extracted from the DWFNs. However, it was concluded that 
the current practice of calculating access fees has only a tenuous link 
to the "value of access" and that alternative taxation regimes should 
be evaluated with the objective of more adequately reflecting the true 
value of access. The only alternative for these island nations to benefit 
from their tuna resource is to, either individually or jointly, increase 
their direct participation in the harvesting and, if considered financially 
viable, the processing of tuna. The nsks associated with such actions, 
however, are considerably greater than those inherent in the collection 
of fees from DWFNs. 
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